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Language, Signs, and the Performance of Power
The Discursive Struggle over Decolonization 
in the Bolivia of Evo Morales
by
Rosaleen Howard
The spread of the term “decolonization” in Bolivian political discourse since the com-
ing to power of Evo Morales is an example of the ways in which shifts in the use of 
language may constitute the processes of change of which they are part. Opposing ide-
ologies are being expressed through various channels (language, dress, symbolism, and 
ritual) in the struggle for dominance in the public sphere. The mass media play a dual 
role, both providing illustrations of the discursive processes at work and discursively 
countering decolonization. Despite media opposition, Morales and the Movimiento al 
Socialismo are developing the structural conditions necessary for previously marginal-
ized voices to be heard.
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The spread of the term “decolonization” in Bolivian political discourse 
since the coming to power of Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo 
(Movement Toward Socialism—MAS) in January 2006 is an example of the 
ways in which shifts in the use of language can be seen to constitute the very 
processes of change of which they are part.1 This paper will examine how, in 
Bolivia today, opposing ideologies are being expressed through various meaning-
bearing channels in the struggle for dominance in the public sphere. Such 
channels include but are not limited to language, and therefore the term 
“sign” will be used all-inclusively to refer to the meaningful units under dis-
cussion. Voloshinov’s (1986 [1929]: 13; Hall, 1982: 78) use of the concept of the 
“ideological sign” as a site of struggle located in all forms of “materialized 
communication”—including language, image, sound, gesture, and bodily 
adornment—will be an analytical reference point. On the one hand, messages 
expressed in a range of media signify decolonizing action in the cultural, 
social, and political fields. On the other hand, such messages are countered by 
oppositional discourses that seek to maintain the status quo. Insofar as a 
word, gesture, or image may become the site of contested meanings during a 
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heightened period of change such as we are witnessing in Bolivia, we can 
make use of Voloshinov’s (1986 [1929]: 23) notion of the “multiaccentuality” of 
the ideological sign. I shall also propose that such meaning making can be 
treated as evidence of the discursive “performance” of power, both enacting and 
counteracting the decolonizing process.
THE IDEA OF DECOLONIZATION IN BOLIVIA TODAY
The struggle of Morales and the MAS to overturn the existing hegemony 
in Bolivia is encapsulated, for the purposes of this article, in the range of 
understandings (or multiaccentuality) brought to the idea of decolonization, 
some of which are mutually compatible while others are in tension with each 
other. In an everyday sense, “decolonization” connotes reversal of the colo-
nial order, undoing the wrongs of history, and releasing colonized subjects 
from domination, injustice, and oppression. With independence from Spain 
in the nineteenth century, decolonization for the creole elites in the Andean 
states was something quite different from what it would have been for the 
indigenous populations, for whom independence never amounted to libera-
tion. In the contemporary period, by contrast, and from the standpoint of the 
Bolivian indigenous and peasant movements, decolonization involves over-
throwing the exploitative, unjust, and discriminatory order that persisted 
beyond independence from Spain and into the twentieth century; it evokes 
a range of related meanings from liberation to emancipation, democracy, 
and autonomy.
On the one hand, indigenous decolonization can entail ideological radical-
ism, whereby a return to a former order, or pachakuti (Quechua for “world 
turning”), is sought, as with the Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (Pachakuti 
Indigenous Movement—MIP) led by Morales’s erstwhile rival Felipe Quispe. 
On the other hand, for Bolivian intellectuals such as Silvia Rivera (2006) and 
Esteban Ticona (2006), decolonization is about shifting the epistemological 
center, allowing new forms of knowledge to evolve and be recognized—a 
kind of “decolonization of the mind.” Yet again, for the president with a 
“post-neoliberal” socialist agenda, decolonization will be achieved through 
economic strategies such as nationalizing the hydrocarbons industry and 
channeling its profits into social-benefit programs and legislation based on the 
terms of the new constitution.2 In addition, decolonization forms the backbone 
of the proposed new education bill drafted in 2006 by the education minister 
Félix Patzi (Howard, 2009b), and Article 78.I of the new constitution explicitly 
states: “Education is . . . democratic, participatory, communitarian, decoloniz-
ing, and of quality” (República de Bolivia, 2009, my emphasis). In line with the 
politics of Evo Morales and the MAS, the concept applies to all the social sec-
tors that have been marginalized through elite political, economic, and cul-
tural hegemony.
In response to the “left-indigenous” inflections of the concept thus far iden-
tified, we find countersignifications coming from the opposition, for example, 
a reading of decolonization as a lowering of standards and verbal attempts to 
discredit or silence the decolonizing discourse of the Morales regime.3
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DISCURSIVE STRUGGLE OVER 
DECOLONIZATION: EXPRESSIVE CHANNELS
I shall take textual examples of the discursive struggle over decolonization 
from press and television news coverage, scholarly papers, and Internet sites, 
focusing on the following periods: (1) early January 2006, around the time of 
the presidential inauguration; (2) August 2006, when the Constituent Assembly 
was inaugurated in Sucre; and (3) February–March 2008, after the Constituent 
Assembly’s December 2007 approval of the draft constitution.4 As far as lan-
guage is concerned, decolonization is expressed at a number of levels: in the 
thematic content of discourse, in the form of language, from vocabulary to 
phonetics, and in the choices speakers make concerning which language to 
speak, when, and to whom. Other semiotic channels—dress code, ritual, and 
symbol—can also be read as discursively producing decolonization and at times 
intersect with each other and with language itself in mutually reinforcing 
ways. The media play a dual role. On the one hand, the press and television 
provide us with illustrations of the discursive processes at work. On the other 
hand, as a terrain of struggle they can be found to perform decolonization 
discursively or to counter it with oppositional discourses.
LANGUAGE, DISCOURSE, VOICE, AND THE PERFORMANCE OF POWER
The word “language” here refers to a communicative tool in which func-
tional competence is acquired (“linguistic code”) and is distinguished from 
“discourse,” the ideologically grounded and value-laden modes of significa-
tion constitutive of the social order. However, whereas Foucault (1971) 
envisages discourse as a primarily verbal phenomenon, I shall use it more 
broadly to include nonlinguistic symbolic forms that may replace or support 
the verbal message. In the Andes, the meaning-bearing functions of clothing 
styles and ritual acts are correlated with linguistic messages in a myriad of 
culturally specific ways, constituting what Hall (1982; 1997) describes as 
“signifying practices.” Following Butler’s (2007) usage of “performance” in 
her work on gender identity and that of Howard (2009a) as a tool for decon-
structing Andean cultural identities, I propose the expression “performance 
of power” as a means to conceptualize power as exercised through signify-
ing practices, that is, as discursively constituted in such practices rather than 
external to them.
The related concepts of “dominant discourse” and “voice” have the greatest 
explanatory power for exploring the issues of hegemony, counterhegemony, 
subversion, and resistance that lie at the heart of the discursive struggle over 
decolonization as conceived here. The dominant discourse—a set of stylisti-
cally and ideologically privileged parameters for the discursive production 
and reproduction of the dominant social order—is hegemonically constituted, 
associated with a given socio-historical moment, and access to it may depend 
on variables such as age, gender, race, ethnicity, educational level, and eco-
nomic status. The idea of voice allows us to talk about the ways in which colo-
nized groups were historically prevented from, variously, evolving a discourse 
that would be heard under the colonial order, developing their own languages 
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for an increasing range of functions over time, and acquiring new linguistic 
codes sufficiently well for effective interaction with the wider society.
Lack of voice, social injustice, economic inequality, and political disempow-
erment have been intimately linked throughout Andean colonial and postco-
lonial history. Pratt (1996: 10) evokes the symbolic violence of this experience 
by commenting on the detail that the rebel Tupac Amaru’s tongue should 
have been cut out upon his execution in Cuzco in 1781: “The cutting out of the 
tongue . . . is one of the few things that both sides in the conflict did to each 
other’s bodies. Apart from whatever symbolic castration is involved, surely 
this practice has meaning with respect to the problem and power of language 
in colonial struggles.” And the symbolic power of language (see also Bourdieu, 
1991) is at the heart of Spivak’s (1993) discussion in her foundational paper 
“Can the Subaltern Speak?” as Beverley (1999: 29) proposes: “When Gayatri 
Spivak makes the claim that the subaltern cannot speak, she means that the 
subaltern cannot speak in a way that would carry any sort of authority or 
meaning for us without altering the relations of power/knowledge that 
constitute it as subaltern in the first place.” Beverley (1999: 28) takes up the 
idea that discourse is constituted as a nexus between power and knowledge 
(Foucault, 1980) and further formulates his point in terms of a “conceptual 
binary of verbal fluency-power versus mutism-subalternity.” His observations 
invite us to propose the hypothesis that a shift in power/knowledge relations 
might enable historically subordinated groups and individuals to be listened 
to in languages and/or registers that had hitherto rendered them mute and 
that, furthermore, a dialectical relationship between discursive and political 
empowerment might potentially evolve. I shall explore this hypothesis by 
presenting textual evidence of the discursive struggle over decolonization in 
Bolivia through verbal, aesthetic, and ritual channels.
LINGUISTIC DECOLONIZATION UNDER MORALES?
Because of the persistent dominant ideology of Spanish monolingualism 
and concomitant limited functions for Amerindian tongues in the wider soci-
ety, linguistic diversity, mediated by racially constituted social hierarchies, 
still produces inequality today. Some indigenous language-speakers feel stig-
matized by their linguistic and cultural identities (Howard, 2007); even when 
they use Spanish, they suffer from lack of access to the dominant discourse. In 
educational, political, and professional spheres this means a perceived lack of 
competence in the appropriate register (stylistic features, pronunciation, and 
range of vocabulary that differentiate formal language from “popular” speech). 
With the coming to government in Bolivia of a party whose main power base 
lies in the indigenous sectors (62 percent of the population according to the 
2001 census) and one that proposes a decolonizing agenda, we can ask in what 
ways decolonization reveals a linguistic face. To put it in terms of Spivak’s 
(1993) question, is the subaltern becoming able to speak?
The 2001 census reveals a 50:50 split in the Bolivian population between 
Spanish monolinguals and those who speak an indigenous language with 
or without Spanish in addition. Since the 1992 census, there had been a 
10 percent dip in the level of bilingualism, with a corresponding rise in 
Spanish monolingualism, although the percentage of monolingual indigenous 
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language-speakers had remained stable at around 11.5 percent (Molina and 
Albó, 2006). The latter stability may be related to the fact that intercultural 
bilingual education for indigenous children was implemented in primary 
schools during the same period, under the terms of the 1994 education reform 
(Law 1565) (Howard, 2009b). This law has been discredited under Morales 
because of its association with the 1990s neoliberal reforms, and the new edu-
cation reform bill still awaits passage through the congress (Howard, 2009b). 
This legislative hiatus has created the perception of a paradox whereby the 
country’s first indigenous government is perceived as doing little to support 
the use of indigenous languages.
In fact, the new constitution makes plentiful provision for such support, 
although the necessary legislation has yet to be passed. Furthermore, legisla-
tion alone cannot bring about linguistic democracy; negative social attitudes 
and the habits of bilinguals (who tend to use Spanish in formal contexts) are 
hard to shift. Nonetheless, the constitution declares 36 indigenous languages 
as official alongside Spanish and requires government representatives to use 
“at least two official languages,” one of them Spanish (Article 5.II, República 
de Bolivia, 2009).5 MAS government members conduct their affairs mainly in 
Spanish, constitutional reform notwithstanding. From electoral success it does 
not necessarily follow that the linguistically mediated barriers that previously 
kept them out of government have suddenly vanished; there is a legitimacy 
attached to the speaking of Spanish in formal settings that will be slow to be 
modified. This said, even speaking Spanish, unless it is encoded according to 
the norms of speech of the socially dominant classes, is not a panacea for lin-
guistic discrimination (Freeland, 2008).
When Morales came to power, public attention was drawn to his signifying 
practices and those of members of the MAS government. In certain respects 
these practices did not conform to the norms of communicative behavior 
expected of a ruling group. The very fact that they attracted comment sug-
gests that the aforementioned hypothesis regarding the relationship between 
linguistic, discursive, and political empowerment was beginning to be borne 
out. I shall argue that negative public reactions to such signifying practices can 
be read as an expression of resistance to the changing political order. For clarity 
of argument, as far as examples relating to the verbal channel are concerned, 
I shall discuss first issues of language form (linguistic code and register) and 
then issues of voice and its representation in the media. Insofar as both sets of 
issues have to do with legitimacy and delegitimation of language use, it will 
be seen that they are interrelated.
1. How should a president speak? Evo Morales was born into an Aymara 
community in the Bolivian altiplano but spent much of his youth in Spanish- 
and Quechua-speaking parts of the country to which his parents migrated 
for economic reasons. The territorial uprooting that comes by definition with 
migration is one of the most common triggers of shift to Spanish among 
speakers of indigenous languages, in the Andes as elsewhere in Latin 
America (von Gleich, 2004; Howard, 2007: 110–115). The social-geographical 
setting for Morales’s subsequent political career—among the highland 
immigrants of the coca-growing Chapare lowlands (Canessa, 2006: 250)—
would have further reinforced his use of Spanish as a language of intercul-
tural communication. To judge by his public speeches, he does not use the 
6    LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
indigenous mother tongues of many members of his popular base in com-
municating with them.
The present research has depended on secondhand information as to 
whether Morales “really” speaks any of the Amerindian languages of high-
land Bolivia, and I have so far found no categorical knowledge of this matter 
in the public domain. In my view, the lack of certainty on this question is due in 
part to the problematic relationship between language use and social-class 
identity in the Andean states. To press for a categorical answer, I believe, would 
be to overlook the intrinsically contingent nature of Andean cultural identities 
and their linguistic dimensions, as much in everyday life as in today’s identity 
politics. As Canessa (2006: 250) observes, “While [Morales] refers to his indig-
enous roots . . . he is careful to avoid presenting himself and his party as sim-
ply an indigenous party, even as he lays out his programme with regular 
reference to indigeneity.” The relationship between indigenous identity and 
use of the indigenous language can, furthermore, be considered in light of the 
2001 Bolivian census, according to which 62 percent of the population over 
age 15 identify themselves as indigenous while only 49.3 percent claim to 
speak an indigenous language (Molina and Albó, 2006). It is therefore not 
incongruous for Morales to claim Aymara identity while making little active 
use of the language. Canessa sums up the problem facing analysts: “[Morales] 
is frequently reported in the press as speaking both languages, although there 
is some debate as to whether he speaks either at all” (see also Albro, 2005, as 
cited by Canessa), and the journalist Waldo Peña Cazas, writing in the Sucre 
daily Correo del Sur (July 20, 2008), ironically refers to Morales’s mother tongue 
as one “which even he, apparently, cannot identify.”
The above discussion notwithstanding, according to the biographer Martín 
Sivak (2008: 56), Morales made a conscious decision with regard to language 
use: “As the years went by, Evo opted to speak Spanish because, in his own 
words, it allowed him to centralize (centralizar) communication. Some campesino 
and originario rivals were to criticize his inability to make speeches in Aymara 
or Quechua.”6 The term centralizar expresses the fact that speaking Spanish 
enables Morales to have broad appeal rather than being more narrowly aligned 
with the indigenous groupings in the country. His speech is pitched in an infor-
mal register with which he reaches out to his popular base, speakers of indig-
enous languages and Spanish alike. Any one paragraph from the text of his 
speech at the opening of the Constituent Assembly on August 6, 2006, can serve 
to illustrate the passion he brings to his public speaking, without paying too 
much attention to the rigors of normative syntax. For example, “Now we are 
here, all together to change that mistreated Bolivia, those humiliated peoples, 
those discriminated peoples, despised, to tell our brother constituents, our sis-
ter constituents, that clearly they have an enormous responsibility to change 
our Bolivia” (Morales, 2006). In contrast to former vice president Cárdenas and 
MIP leader Quispe, furthermore, Morales rarely uses traditional Andean meta-
phors (references to the ayllu and pachakuti) in his speeches, which is indica-
tive of a more class-based than indigenist orientation. His use of the various 
Aymara, Quechua, and Guaraní words for “beautiful day” to describe the 
dawning of the new political era in his inaugural address to the Constituent 
Assembly (Morales, 2006) is an exception to this general rule.
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When I was in Bolivia in August 2006, friends and colleagues in academic 
circles frequently expressed their views on the way Morales and other mem-
bers of his cabinet spoke Spanish. A professional linguist and leading figure in 
the intercultural bilingual education field, implicitly touching on the issue of 
the relationship between language and power that preoccupies theorists such 
as Voloshinov (1986 [1929]), Gramsci (as in Ives, 2004), and Bourdieu (1991), 
reflected on whether those newly in power might be consciously using infor-
mal registers of Spanish in formal settings as “a challenge to lay down a new 
set of norms” (L. E. López, personal communication, August 2006). It is not 
my intention here to enter into phonetic analysis. Suffice it to say that occa-
sional slippage reveals Aymara influence on the way Morales pronounces his 
vowels—the notoriously stigmatized feature of Andean Spanish known as 
mote (Cerrón-Palomino, 2003). “Prodocción” for “producción” is one example 
from my 2006 fieldnotes.
Whether there is substance to the metalinguistic comments of observers 
(myself included) is less important to my argument than the fact that they 
express a popular perception. When negatively expressed, this perception 
confirms the point that speaking Spanish is not a panacea for linguistic 
discrimination. The following sardonic, though not unsympathetic, com-
ment from the journalist Waldo Peña Cazas (Correo del Sur, May 27, 2007) is 
illustrative:
There is something for which people will not forgive Evo Morales: his mixed-up 
Spanish (español atravesado) with strange interferences. People say “he can’t 
speak,” the assumption being that speaking well means subjecting oneself to 
grammatical rules and linguistic usages that, strictly speaking, are no more than 
the norms of speech of the ruling classes. The problem of Goni Sánchez [ex-
President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada] was worse, but his Spanish was mixed 
up with English and that was socially acceptable.
Peña Cazas’s words confirm the point made by the sociolinguist Deborah 
Cameron (1995: 11), writing of language ideologies in the English-speaking 
world, that a focus on language may be a smokescreen for social discrimina-
tion actually rooted in nonlinguistic anxieties; concerns about language, in her 
words, “get recruited to non-linguistic concerns.” The above extract provides 
insight into the way in which metalinguistic discourse may channel and mask 
the fears of the “ruling classes” as political power shifts its center of gravity in 
Bolivia under Morales.
A year later, as the same writer pursues the argument (Correo del Sur, 
July 20, 2008), we note his ironic allusion to what is commonly construed as 
the president’s indeterminate linguistic identity:
Evo Morales . . . expresses himself in a style of language that is unusual in public 
life, not only because of his social background but above all because his Spanish 
is influenced by a mother tongue which even he, apparently, cannot identify. 
What I notice in Evo’s language is greater simplicity and some relation between 
what he says and what he thinks, although he doesn’t always think well. He 
doesn’t use the impressive but anodyne fillers (muletillas) typical of traditional 
political language, meaningless expressions whose only function is to get the 
speaker off the hook.
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It also seems ironic that the head of state does not seem to adhere to Article 5.II 
of the new constitution. The quotations from both Sivak and Peña Cazas sug-
gest that Morales is open to criticism from several sides because of the way he 
chooses to speak: from his indigenous base for not speaking their languages 
and from the middle classes for using an “inappropriate” register of Spanish. 
At the level of linguistic code it seems he is in a bind (cf. Graham, 2002). In 
terms of language ideologies, the issue is who is recognized as having the 
power to determine the norm. There is a tension here between Morales’s appar-
ent aim to reach out to all groups alike and the facts of the relationship between 
language and symbolic power.7
2. “Let her speak when she learns Spanish!” During the Constituent Assembly 
proceedings, the MAS delegate Isabel Domínguez objected to the declaration 
of an adjournment at a moment when a heated party political divide over the 
decree nationalizing the gas industry had opened up in the chamber. As she 
spoke, she switched from Spanish, the general language of the proceedings, to 
her mother tongue, Quechua. Despite the fact that 55.8 percent of the dele-
gates identified themselves as “originary or indigenous” and the fact that of 
this percentage 64.7 percent were speakers of an Amerindian language (Albó, 
2008: 55), there was no rule allowing these languages to be officially used in 
the assembly. Domínguez’s “code switching”8 provoked the following reac-
tion (La Prensa, August 24, 2006):
The Chair didn’t know whom to give the floor to. Then whistles were heard and 
everyone was speaking at once. People became more exasperated when the MAS 
delegate Isabel Domínguez spoke out, “We came here to work . . . ,” she said. The 
words spoken in Quechua generated protest from the [right-wing party] 
PODEMOS benches. “Let her speak when she learns Spanish!” shouted the 
PODEMOS representative Beatriz Capobianco, while her colleagues drummed 
their fists on the desks.
Domínguez was attacked for inappropriate use of Quechua in a space where, 
at least tacitly, only the language of coloniality, Spanish, was deemed in order.9 
In terms of the theoretical premises set out earlier, hers was an emergent sub-
altern voice upon which a member of the existing hegemonic order sought to 
reimpose mutism. The conflict was not over Domínguez’s words as such but 
over the appropriateness of the sign system she employed. In Voloshinov’s 
(1986 [1929]) terms, the episode provides a clear example of the playing out of 
social struggle in the use of language. From this example and the previous one 
it is apparent that issues of linguistic decolonization pertain as much to use of 
popular Spanish as to the use of indigenous languages in the public sphere.
PERFORMING DECOLONIZATION THROUGH THE LANGUAGE OF DRESS
In the Andean countries, clothing styles constitute a terrain of symbolic 
struggle in almost equal measure to language itself. A number of researchers 
(e.g., Femenías, 2005) have examined how dress (among other items, the pon-
cho in men and the dirndl skirt [pollera] in women) serves to index hierarchies 
and boundaries variously conceived in terms of region, class, ethnicity, and 
gender. Crucially, the potential for style switching in dress is exploited in 
ways similar to code switching in language, according to social setting and 
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for effects of power and identity construction. In contemporary Bolivian poli-
tics, dress is a key dimension of the performance of power in the terms previ-
ously defined.
During the early Morales period, public attention focused on the semiotics 
of the president’s dress style, which variously evoked his working-class roots 
and the pre-Columbian past, according to the setting and the audience he 
was seeking to reach. Soon after winning the elections he embarked on a series 
of visits to world leaders in Latin America and Europe and the United Nations 
in New York City. His clothing style, which departed from dress code conven-
tions for such occasions, incited media commentary: “Since Morales began his 
tour of America and Europe, . . . his outfit, characterized by a pair of slacks, a 
shirt (usually short-sleeved), a sweater, and a windbreaker (chamarra), has 
attracted attention” (La Razón, January 6, 2006). The matter became the subject 
of media polemic turning on whether his clothing could be read as a sign of 
disrespect for his hosts or, conversely, as a “declaration of principles” (La 
Razón, January 6, 2006, citing the Spanish columnist Rosa Belmonte). Either 
way, the powerful performative function of dress choice was recognized, in 
the words of Antoni Gutiérrez-Rubi, writing in the Cochabamba newspaper 
Opinión (January 8, 2006), as follows: “There is nothing more potent in politi-
cal communication than to see businessmen, ministers, presidents, and even 
kings, honoring, when not adulating, a simple man in a sweater . . . but one 
who is president of his country. Morales knows what he is doing, and he is 
conscious of the international media dimension of his image.”10
The symbolism of both dress and ritual was invoked still more powerfully 
during the president’s ritual inauguration at the ancestral site of Tiwanaku on 
January 22, 2006. As Postero (2007: 1) describes it, “He walked barefoot over 
paths covered with coca leaves to the top of the Akapana pyramid, [where] 
“traditional spiritual leaders dressed him in a red tunic, covered his head with 
a four-cornered cap representing the four cardinal points, and bestowed on 
him the staff of office marking him as the Apumallku.” While the sweater and 
chamarra worn on the international circuit had conveyed an uncompromising 
message about “staying with his class roots,” the red tunic and headdress at 
Tiwanaku evoked the pre-Columbian past, yet with the ceremony being trans-
mitted globally via satellite technology.
The inauguration process also involved formal investiture in the Palacio de 
Gobierno (Government Palace), where Morales was decorated with the insig-
nia of the nation: the presidential sash in the colors of the Bolivian flag and 
the Simón Bolívar medallion. The power of the symbolism involved here had 
led former President Carlos Mesa to speculate about the self-image the presi-
dent might choose to project on this occasion: “It will be the first time in his-
tory that a president receives the sash and the medallion of office without a 
suit and tie. But how will he dress? Will he wear a chamarra in the blue of his 
party and an open-necked shirt? Will he wear a poncho, which he has never 
normally worn in his life?” (Landes, 2006). In the event, Morales hit on a com-
promise that says much about his skill in negotiating divergent semiotic 
fields. He had a jacket tailored from alpaca cloth in natural colors and 
trimmed with a woven Andean design. This is the dress code he has now 
adopted for all state occasions. The semiotic skill at work here lies in the fact 
that the jackets are contemporary in form while being vernacular Andean in 
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substance—a combination reminiscent of the “cultural reconversion” that 
García Canclini (1992) describes in his work on cultural hybridity.11 Morales is 
not alone in signaling a new sociopolitical order through his style of dress. 
A number of his women ministers retained their Andean clothing style on 
assuming office, two examples being Silvia Lazarte and Casimira Rodríguez, 
whose social origins are indexed by their use of the pollera and wide-brimmed 
straw hat of the warm valley region.
PANPIPES, FLAGS, AND GARLANDS: POPULAR 
PARTICIPATORY PERFORMANCE OF POWER
In addition to dress, other semiotic channels, such as music, flags, and gar-
lands, mediate the performance of power among the MAS and its supporters 
in the social organizations. On February 28, 2008, the congress passed a set of 
laws designed to facilitate a call to referendum on the new draft constitution. 
Media coverage of the occasion provides evidence of popular participatory 
aspects of political performance in which the symbolic dimensions of lan-
guage, dress, and music combine. During the week, indigenous and peasant 
organizations had mobilized from all over the country and converged outside 
the congress (in the Plaza Murillo in La Paz) to pressure the government to 
pass the laws. Dressed in full indigenous regalia, they set up camp with con-
sorts of panpipe players (widely associated with ritual practice in Andean 
cultures), banners displaying the names of their organizations, and the rain-
bow flag (wiphala)—a checkered ensign in the colors of the rainbow that sym-
bolizes the pluricultural nation. Article 6.II of the constitution declares the 
wiphala an official symbol of the Bolivian state alongside the red, yellow, and 
green tricolor, the national anthem, the coat of arms, and certain floral emblems.12 
When Morales emerged to announce the legislation, he was greeted with cheers, 
shouts, and bursts of triumphal music from the crowd.
The tone of Morales’s speech to his supporters (“I feel that once more the 
Bolivian people are making history,” TV Boliviana news footage, February 28, 
2008) and the theatricality of the Plaza Murillo occupation contributed to the 
performative repositioning of the locus of power from the traditional parties 
to the MAS, and features of attire matched the rallying language. Morales and 
his ministers had their necks draped with garlands, and there was a festive 
air. In rural community festivals in Bolivia, garlands festoon the statues of 
saints and flowers adorn people’s hats. In the contemporary political context 
the garland can be seen as a means to honor the wearer and evoke celebration. 
In other settings, such as when speaking to the armed forces, Morales’s style 
is more sober; while he wears one of his trademark woven jackets, the gar-
lands are absent.
MEDIA ROLES IN THE DISCURSIVE 
STRUGGLE OVER DECOLONIZATION
The sources used in this study have in common that they mediate between 
the live events and the viewer, listener, or reader on the receiving end. Each 
text (whether written or oral in origin) has been encoded (selected, edited, 
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[re-]presented) to give it the shape it has. In the case of the mass media, this 
process may amount not merely to “mediation” but to “mediatization,” in 
terms of Cottle’s (2006) distinction. Cottle (2006: 9) emphasizes the “performa-
tive involvement and constitutive role” of the media in their relation to conflict, 
as opposed to a role of “reflection” or even “representation” of the events 
reported upon. This perspective ties in with Erick Torrico Villanueva’s (2008: 37) 
observation regarding the increasingly “techno-political” role of the media 
in Bolivia, whereby “political space” becomes “predominantly framed and 
defined by the media.”
The media appear not only to mediate the struggle over decolonization in 
Bolivia under Morales but also to engage that struggle as active players. The 
examples I offer invite us to ask whether the intervention of the media can be 
seen to put a brake on the government’s ability to evolve its own agency—
whether “techno-politics” allows members of the new political class to “speak 
for themselves” or stifles their newfound voice. At the time this research was 
conducted, the Bolivian daily press was without exception controlled by pri-
vate enterprise and/or oligarchic groups that had little sympathy with the 
MAS.13 Its editorials tended to be relentlessly antigovernment. With regard to 
television the same could be said with the exception of Channel 7, TV 
Boliviana, which represents the interests of the government of the day.
ANTIDECOLONIZATION DISCOURSE IN THE MEDIA
The discursive struggle over decolonization is attested to in examples of 
counterdiscourse that cropped up in the print media with some regularity in 
2006.14 Critics and political opponents wasted no time in attempting to 
redefine decolonization in ways that delegitimated it and Morales. A vitriolic 
attack by a supporter of the Nación Camba (Camba Nation, a right-wing 
social movement based around Santa Cruz) was given a manifesto-like full-
page spread in the Cochabamba broadsheet Los Tiempos (Carvalho, 2006). This 
text merges multiple discursive lines of attack: it creates a caricature of decol-
onization that transforms respect for indigenous languages and practices into 
disrespect for nonindigenous culture and then implies that Morales is a hypo-
crite for failing to adhere to the caricature. In addition, it identifies the MAS 
program with foreign radicalism as personified by Hugo Chávez. According 
to this distorted version, decolonization requires rejection of “the damned 
Spanish language” (el maldito castellano) and nonindigenous clothing (“The 
chamarra and sweater have nothing to do with the clothing of the Collasuyo”) 
and would condemn as “imperialist” modern technology such as cell phones 
(la tecnología celular imperialista). Thus, in right-wing discourse, cultural decol-
onization morphs into the rejection of everything nonindigenous rather than 
the end of centuries-long oppression of indigenous peoples and cultures that 
it signifies to MAS supporters. By this fictitious standard, Morales fails to live 
up to his call for decolonization. Furthermore, the reference to Morales’s use 
of the cell phone “to communicate with his friend Chávez” activates Bolivian 
right-wing anxiety over the president’s friendship with Venezuela’s left-wing 
regime. In right-wing Bolivian discourse “Chávez” is an ideologically charged 
sign that stands for erosion of democracy and attacks on private economic 
initiative, whereas in MAS discourse it is identified with the struggle for social 
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justice and resistance to transnational interests. In Carvalho’s (2006) text, lan-
guage, dress, modern technology, and Chávez stand as ideological signs that 
condense the discursive struggle over decolonization; in the (de-)colonial set-
ting, they are inherently multiaccentual signifiers in Voloshinov’s terms.
In a further example, Cuba acts as a similarly multiaccentual sign. El Diario 
(a La Paz broadsheet) carried a piece whose author expresses the hope that 
decolonization in Bolivia will not be along the lines of “the Cuban model of 
generalized poverty” (Zeballos H., 2006) and goes on to criticize the former 
education minister Patzi’s call for a decolonized education system purport-
edly to be founded on the knowledge and science of Bolivia’s “other civiliza-
tions.” This extract is striking for its inherently circular logic, by which it 
seems to defeat its own professedly antidecolonizing argument: “[Patzi’s pro-
posal] is fantastic musing (elucubración fantasiosa), for if such civilizations and 
forms of knowledge had existed, the indigenous people would not be living 
with technological backwardness and poverty despite the attempts that have 
been made for years to incorporate them into modern development, lamenta-
bly with poor results.” Once again, the contested meanings of decolonization 
reveal the discursive struggle over this key sign. Whereas the MAS equates 
decolonization with liberation through the transformation of institutions that 
reproduce indigenous subordination, right-wing discourse counters with 
decolonization as the reproduction of “backwardness,” which is counterposed 
to what the right considers a superior Western “modernity.”
MEDIA COMMENT ON THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY PROCEEDINGS
The Constituent Assembly installed in Sucre on August 6, 2006, became a 
process whereby for the first time representatives of the traditional political 
parties and the indigenous and peasant social organizations shared a space 
for deliberation on a national project, defined as the “refounding of Bolivia” 
(Valcarce, 2008). As the work of the assembly’s commissions got under way, the 
media criticized the indigenous delegates’ mode of participation. One example 
of such criticism appeared in the Cochabamba daily Opinión (August 22, 2006):
Disorder and nervousness. The first meetings of the Constituent Assembly have 
not been the best from an organic and institutional point of view. This is under-
standable, because the majority of the delegates are people who have never had 
experience of taking part in meetings with a sense of order and basic internal 
principles. Many of them come from unions and other organizations where the 
norm is improvised debate and shouting to make themselves heard and get 
motions passed. . . . The disorientation of the delegates reached such an extreme 
that some of them thought they could perform ritual libations with alcohol dur-
ing the work sessions, although of course those who broke the rules in this way 
justified the act by saying it was “indigenous custom.”
This delegitimation of ritual libation can be read as an attempt to suppress 
indigenous practice when it appears to intrude into a site of state political 
power—indeed, when it appears to take on a role in performing such power. 
Insofar as ritual is a communicative medium, this is equally an attempt to 
reimpose mutism, to deny the indigenous performance of power, and to define 
social and political boundaries according to the norms of the status quo.
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However, the practice of ritual libation (ch’alla) to which the journalist 
refers, which involves drinking and sprinkling alcohol and uttering a few 
words of blessing, is widespread across all social classes in Bolivia in both 
rural and urban settings. The ch’alla, an act of communication with the gods 
of the Andean cosmos, is performed as a means to bless crops and animals in 
indigenous communities, just as the urban middle-classes perform it to bless 
a new vehicle or inaugurate a house or public building. Ch’alla Tuesday, after 
Carnival, is a public holiday on which people focus on the rituals owed to 
their houses, businesses, and fields, as the case may be. The ritual authority to 
perform the ch’alla is usually conferred on a shaman in all these settings. 
Thus, it can be seen as a primordial feature of indigenous culture that has been 
integrated into that of the society at large. The journalist’s tone suggests that 
he sees the introduction of the ritual into the conduct of the Constituent 
Assembly as evidence of a worrying articulation of indigenous ritual practice 
with the ceremonial norms of “modernity” of the criollo-mestizo class. However, 
given the wider context, to perform the ch’alla as a means of securing a suc-
cessful outcome for the collective drafting of the new constitution is a wholly 
appropriate act.
It is not, however, just indigenous ritual that this journalist attempts to 
delegitimate. He also creates an image of procedural incompetence on the part 
of the indigenous delegates by forging a discursive link between their union 
and social-movement backgrounds and the supposed disorder, rowdiness, 
and ineffectiveness of the social organizations they represent.
COMMENT ON MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS AS DECOLONIZING STRATEGY
In making his nominations for new ministerial appointments in 2006, 
Morales broke with conventional criteria of eligibility for such posts and in so 
doing put into practice social and political values that can be seen as decoloniz-
ing. A journalist in Opinión (August 23, 2006) comments ironically on this move:
The new Bolivian ambassador to the United States is a long-haired career jour-
nalist with no previous diplomatic experience and scant knowledge of English. 
Gustavo Guzmán was perplexed when President Evo Morales called him at six 
in the morning to make an appointment with him at the presidential palace, 
where he asked him to represent the revolutionary government of Bolivia in 
Washington. “I said, ‘compañero Evo, please’”—these were Guzmán’s first words 
to the president, as he reported them to the Associated Press. He asked Morales 
if he thought he was capable of taking on such a task. “And he answered me, ‘And 
you, have you ever imagined what capacity I have to be president of the 
Republic?’ With that reply it was impossible for me to say no.” Guzmán is the 
latest surprising nomination made by Morales since he took over as the first 
indigenous president of Bolivia in December. A former domestic servant is min-
ister of justice. A peasant woman coca grower with little formal education heads 
the assembly that is rewriting the constitution, and a singer of the Quechua lan-
guage is ambassador to France.
Voloshinov (1986 [1929]: 23) problematizes meaning not merely as the prod-
uct of a referential relationship between language (or some other signifying 
medium) and the world but as the outcome or ongoing trace of social struggle. 
Such a struggle is inherent in two important ways in this extract, both of 
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which reveal aspects of the mediatization of the political process. Struggle 
inheres, first, in the selection of particular ideologically loaded signs and, 
second, in the omission of factual content in the interest of encouraging one 
“preferred reading” (Hall, 1982) over another. In light of Hall’s (1982: 62–65) 
thesis regarding the role of the media in consensus formation and Cottle’s 
(2006: 9) emphasis on performance, we can read the item as a performative 
attempt on the part of the press to hold back the structural forces of change that 
the coming to power of the MAS has set in train. However, alternative read-
ings emerge if we look at it in light of Voloshinov’s argument regarding the 
“social multiaccentuality of the ideological sign” (1986 [1929]: 23); depending 
on who the readers are, different meanings will be activated.
The article opens with reference to the appointment of Gustavo Guzmán 
as ambassador to the United States and goes on to refer to other “surprising” 
nominations. The writer’s use of rhetoric betrays ironic intention, which we 
can read at least as criticizing and at most as mocking the governmental 
choices. This is achieved through an accumulation of ideologically embedded 
semiotic pairings whereby, if measured against the dominant consensus in 
Hall’s (1982) terms, social structural categories “normally” kept separate are 
incongruously juxtaposed: the “career journalist” with “no previous diplomatic 
experience,” “long hair,” and “little English” as ambassador to the United States, 
the “former domestic servant” as minister, the “peasant woman coca grower 
with little formal education” as president of the Assembly, the “singer of 
Quechua” as ambassador to France.
The irony is better appreciated if we set the text against the actual selection 
criteria that Morales presumably exercised, which the writer omits to men-
tion. For his U.S. ambassador he turned to a well-established left-wing jour-
nalist whose experience included having been general editor of the weekly 
magazine Pulso and a member of the Bolivian Communist Party in his youth 
(http://www.bolpress.com, July 5, 2006, accessed October 10, 2009). In this 
context, the sign “long-haired” (backed up by a photo of Guzmán that shows 
this feature in close-up) can be taken to reference “socialism” broadly speak-
ing; in the context of Morales’s Bolivia, it is also a potential signifier for “Che” 
(the iconic long-haired leader of revolution in Cuba and Bolivia alike) and 
likely to be taken as a questionable attribute by the readers of this middle-of-
the-road newspaper.
Similar negative intention is suggested by the failure to specify the back-
ground of Casimira Rodríguez, general secretary of the Confederación 
Latinoamericana y del Caribe de las Trabajadoras del Hogar (Latin 
American and Caribbean Confederation of Domestic Workers) between 
2001 and May 2006 (http://www.bbcmundo.com, July 7, 2006, accessed 
October 10, 2009), referring to her instead as a “former domestic servant,” 
and the election of a distinguished woman leader of the Chapare coca 
growers’ federation (Silvia Lazarte) to the presidency of the Constituent 
Assembly is countered by dubbing her a “peasant woman coca grower.” 
The “singer of Quechua” is the internationally renowned Luzmila Carpio, 
long resident in France, whose qualifications are best described in Morales’s 
own words: “She was already our French ambassador. She was a legitimate 
ambassador. I am merely legalizing our compañera Luzmila Carpio’s status 
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as ambassador in France” (http://boliviscopio.blogspot.com, April 23, 2006, 
accessed October 10, 2009).
A further feature of rhetoric with ironic effect lies in the dialogue alleged to 
have taken place between Guzmán and the president. The term of address 
“compañero Evo” references the Latin American left, Fidel in particular. In 
the words attributed to the president, mediatized as reported direct speech, 
the head of state is said to delegitimate even his own qualifications for high 
office, again, as measured against an unspoken consensus. In this textual con-
text, the sign “first indigenous president of Bolivia” is also pejorative, linking 
“indigenous” to “poor judgment.” The positive qualifications of Morales’s 
appointees link them to a track record in left-wing politics and the social 
movements; these details are omitted from the text in favor of value-laden 
signs that demean them and the president who chose them in the eyes of a 
readership unsympathetic to the MAS.
In this text, “long-haired” and “compañero” are multiaccentual signs in 
Voloshinov’s terms: insofar as they reference “revolution,” for those on the left 
they stand for social justice and resistance to imperialism while for those on 
the right they evoke a political-economic model that would threaten the status 
quo. It is this openness of meaning that makes them powerful constituents of 
ideological struggle in discourse. This press item illustrates the role played by 
the Bolivian media in constructing narratives that counter the bid for power 
of the newly ruling party; the mediatization is in itself a performance, conjur-
ing up a vision of incongruity in the actions of the government that will play 
to the prejudices of a certain readership.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper illustrates how the contest for hegemony in Bolivia is being con-
ducted (among other means) as a discursive struggle over decolonization in 
which oppositional signifiers come into play: linguistic codes, discursive 
styles and registers, communicative practices, modes of dress, ritual symbol-
ism, and mediatized performances of all of these. Following Voloshinov (1986 
[1929]) and encouraged by Hall (1982), I have shown how encoded significa-
tion has become a terrain of struggle. On the one hand, such encodings pro-
vide a medium for decolonizing practice: new ways of speaking, dressing, and 
interacting socially may be seen to constitute new ways of performing power. 
However, the role of the media in both portraying the political process and, to 
some extent, performing it (Cottle, 2006) through its interpretation of politi-
cians’ words and deeds is evident. The mediatization of the political agenda 
is thus an important dimension of the discursive struggle over decolonization. 
As far as the conservative mainstream media are concerned, this involves 
countervailing performances: an attempt to “drive inward,” in Voloshinov’s 
(1986 [1929]: 23) phrase, the struggle for change in the social order.
The bid for hegemony of Morales and the MAS-affiliated bloc threatens to 
disrupt the language/knowledge/power paradigm that has hitherto helped 
define relations of power. The media, in contesting the communicative prac-
tices of the new administration, attack the inner workings of the nascent 
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counterhegemony and have the capacity thus to undermine the government’s 
ability not merely to speak but to have its speech recognized, listened to, and 
legitimated in the public sphere. However, despite the oppositional efforts of 
the mass media, as president Evo Morales can be seen as an effective per-
former of popular power, mobilizing the diverse correlating sign systems that 
signify decolonization for a varied range of publics. With regard to Spivak’s 
(1993) foundational question whether the subaltern can speak, in my view we 
are witnessing in Bolivia the gradual evolution of the structural conditions 
necessary for previously marginalized voices to be heard. Through their dis-
cursive performances of decolonization, Morales and the MAS are giving 
Spivak an affirmative reply.
NOTES
 1. For other examples see Howard (2008; 2009b) and Mayorga Ugarte’s (2007) study of the 
synergy between discourse and the political process applied to the neoliberal era of “Gonismo” 
(1985–1989).
 2. In his inaugural speech to the Constituent Assembly on August 6, 2006, Morales (2006) 
juxtaposed the terms “decolonization,” “nationalization,” and “de-neoliberalization.”
 3. The violent confrontations between government supporters and the opposition that have 
flared up since 2006 are not considered “discursive” expressions of struggle for present purposes 
and are therefore beyond the scope of this paper.
 4. Evo Morales convincingly won a second term of office on December 6, 2009, and the 
number of representatives of the social movements elected to the Chamber of Deputies signifi-
cantly increased (http://www.boliviainfoforum.org.uk, accessed December 7, 2009). The con-
solidation of the national political position of Morales and the MAS will lead to an evolution of 
the issues discussed here.
 5. The wording of Article 5.II is vague: “The plurinational government and the departmental 
governments must use at least two official languages. One of these must be Spanish” (República 
de Bolivia, 2009). (All citations from Bolivian sources are my translations from the Spanish.)
 6. Suppression of the vernacular (whether voluntary or involuntary, and leading to an 
apparent “inability” to speak it) is due to a complex of social, cultural, and economic factors, not 
least the stigma attached to the indigenous languages in Bolivia during the decades of Morales’s 
childhood and youth. Given this context, his shift from Aymara to Spanish may have been less 
a matter of choice than Sivak’s use of the word “opt” suggests. Ben Kohl has informed me that 
Morales apparently understands both Aymara and Quechua and speaks a little of both; that his 
Aymara is not fluent is understandable in that he ceased to live in an Aymara-speaking area 
when he was 17 (Kohl, personal communication, December 2009, also citing Andrew Canessa, 
personal communication).
 7. Whether the Spanish-speaking “popular” sectors explicitly approve of Morales’s way of 
speaking and see it as a legitimation of the nonelite register they share with him remains to be 
confirmed by future research.
 8. In sociolinguistic terminology, “code switching” refers to the switch from one language to 
another in the course of a conversation in which the participants speak more than one language.
 9. Simultaneous translation was subsequently introduced in the Constituent Assembly but 
only for the plenary sessions (F. Garcés and P. Regalsky, personal communications, 2009). For 
analysis of the Isabel Domínguez episode, see Garcés (2008) and Valcarce (2008: 45).
10. Morales’s sweater captured the popular imagination to such an extent that the style was 
copied and commercialized by Bolivian knitwear company Punto Blanco (http://www.news.bbc 
.co.uk/2/hi/americas, January 20, 2006; accessed December 12, 2009).
11. It is notable that a similar level of “linguistic reconversion” is not present in Morales’s 
speech habits, where elements of the Amerindian languages are rarely present. See the photo 
gallery at http://evonobel2007.org/ for the complex semiotics of Morales’s public dress styles, 
whereby he attempts to be many things to many people.
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12. The wiphala has a long history in Andean identity politics (van den Berghe and Flores 
Ochoa, 2000: 14–15; Pajuelo Teves, 2007: 147–156). In a global context, the rainbow flag is a quint-
essential multiaccentual sign, also being the symbol of racial democracy in postapartheid South 
Africa and the flag of the Gay Pride movement.
13. The MAS-aligned daily El Cambio was launched since the research was carried out and 
therefore has not been drawn on for the present study.
14. I gratefully acknowledge Rosalind Bresnahan’s contribution to the analysis of the exam-
ples in this section.
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